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RESPONSIBLE ACCOUNTING FOR STAKEHOLDERS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Through a critique of existing financial theory underlying current accounting practices, and 
reapplication of this theory to a broad group of stakeholders, this paper lays a normative 
foundation for a revised perspective on the responsibility of the public accounting 
profession. Specifically, we argue that the profession should embrace the development of 
standards for reporting information important to a broader group of stakeholders than just 
investors and creditors. The FASB has recently moved in the opposite direction. 
Nonetheless, an institution around accounting for stakeholders continues to grow, backed 
by a groundswell of support from many sources. Based on institutional theory, we predict 
that this institution and the forces supporting it will cause changes in the public accounting 
profession, even if through coercion. We also provide examples of stakeholder accounting, 
building from the premise that a primary responsibility of accounting is to provide 
information to address the risk management needs of stakeholders.  
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 So it has come to this.  The global biodiversity crisis is so severe that 
brilliant scientists, political leaders, eco-warriors, and religious gurus 
can no longer save us from ourselves.  The military are powerless.  But 
there may be one last hope for life on earth: accountants.  
 Jonathan Watts, Guardian, October 28, 2010 
 
 The reporting climate for social accountability purposes has changed dramatically in 
the last few decades.  Worldwide interest in environmental sustainability has led to 
initiatives such as the ISO 14000 standards, the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, the Social 
Accountability Network’s SA8000 standard and the work of the Global Reporting 
Initiative™ (GRI), among many others, resulting in significantly more reporting on the 
environmental and social impact of firm operations. It has also become accepted practice 
for large, global companies to issue sustainability reports; and in 2013, 93 percent of the 
250 largest global companies (G250) did so. Further, approximately 59 percent of these 
G250 firms engaged outside experts to independently assure these reports (KPMG, 2013). 
Of course, this means that the remaining 41 percent of these firms did not seek outside 
auditing, and in a broader sample among the largest 100 companies across 41 countries 
(4,100 companies) the rate of assurance is only 38 percent. Further, within the U.S. only 16 
percent of companies issued assured sustainability reports in 2013 (Environmental Leader, 
2014). Since most nonfinancial reporting efforts are voluntary anyway, they paint a picture 
of inconsistent reporting that is of limited use to investors and other stakeholders who are 
now or are considering engaging with a particular firm.  
The view from a financial reporting perspective is quite different.  In the wake of 
corporate scandals and financial stress, the U.S. Government instituted new mandatory 
disclosure regulations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that place more responsibility on 
corporate leaders for ensuring the accuracy and completeness of financial reporting, as 
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well as on auditors to ensure the credibility of these disclosures. The climate is right for the 
public accounting profession to step up and institutionalize nonfinancial disclosures 
similar to the manner in which financial reporting disclosures have been institutionalized; 
that is, through accounting standard setting and assurance processes.  
Unfortunately, the public accounting profession seems to be moving in the opposite 
direction, as reflected by changes in the objectives of financial reporting by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Specifically, FASB Statements No. 1 and 2 (issued in 
1978 and 1980 respectively) provided guidelines for the Conceptual Framework for 
Financial Reporting that included responsibility to a broad group of stakeholders. These 
guidelines were revised substantially in 2010 through the issuance of Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8.  Ernst & Young (2010, p. 1) describe the results of 
these revisions: ‘The revised Framework limits the range of addressees of general purpose 
financial reporting. It lists as primary users of financial statements, existing or potential 
investors, lenders and other creditors. The existing [1978, 1980] Framework, in contrast, 
identified in addition to the addressees listed above, employees, suppliers, customers, 
governments and the general public’. As this description suggests, the primary objective 
underlying current financial reporting is to provide information that is useful to investors 
and creditors, based on the premise that they need information that will allow them to 
make rational investment decisions and ‘assess the prospects for future net cash inflows to 
an entity’ (FASB Concepts Statement No. 8, ¶OB3).  Given that the FASB is the organization 
responsible for establishing accounting and reporting standards in the U.S., this premise 
becomes the foundation for financial reporting. 
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This is a reasonable approach to help protect financial investors; however, it 
disregards the fact that much more than operating capital is invested in a firm. Employees, 
customers, suppliers and communities also provide essential resources to the firm, without 
which the firm would cease to exist (Freeman and Reed, 1983). Like financial stakeholders, 
these stakeholders take risks when they invest in firms because their own outcomes are 
directly affected by the activities of a firm (Clarkson, 1994). Similarly, they need reliable 
information in order to assess what they might be expected to receive from a firm in 
exchange for the resources they provide (Harrison, Bosse and Phillips, 2010). This paper 
argues that the public accounting profession has a responsibility to these stakeholders, 
contrary to the recent actions of the FASB.  We affirm the call given to accounting 
researchers by Moser and Martin (2012, p. 799) to consider a research perspective that 
extends beyond the traditional shareholder view of the corporation, specifically with 
regard to disclosures that ‘serve different or broader purposes than other traditional 
corporate financial disclosures’.   
The overriding objective of this paper is to provide a stronger theoretical and 
practical rationale for integrating investor-focused financial reporting principles with 
stakeholder theory, which emphasizes recognition of multiple stakeholder interests. If we 
take a broad perspective on firm value creation, and recognize that much of the value a firm 
creates (or destroys) is nonfinancial (Harrison and Wicks, 2013), then it is also logical that 
firms should measure and report nonfinancial results of their value creation processes. In 
addition to the benefits to stakeholders from being better able to manage risks associated 
with their investments of nonfinancial (as well as financial) resources in a firm, new 
disclosures of information pertinent to a broader group of stakeholders may have the 
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added benefit of providing management with more tools to help sustain or build a 
successful strategy (Freeman, Harrison and Wicks, 2007; Harrison and Wicks, 2013; 
Harrison, Bosse and Phillips, 2010). 
It is important to create some boundaries for our paper from the outset. Global 
forces are providing an impetus for broader stakeholder reporting; however, the 
complexity associated with these forces, and the variability in rules and regulations 
pertaining to so many different situations, are too vast to tackle in one paper. Thus, our 
emphasis is on reporting in public corporations headquartered in the U.S.  We recognize 
that the U.S. currently is not a leader in the reporting of corporate social responsibility or 
sustainability information (Kolk and Perego, 2010) and, in fact, is one of the most 
shareholder-focused countries in the world (Stout, 2012; LaPorta, et al., 1998). It is for this 
reason that the public accounting profession in the U.S. is an excellent subject for our 
arguments. We also acknowledge that changes in the U.S. reporting system can have 
implications for reporting elsewhere in the world. Ernst & Young (2012) published a study 
comparing U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), established by the FASB, 
to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which are controlled by the IASB. 
They observed that the Boards of the two organizations are continuing to work together on 
specific convergence projects, evidence that what happens with U.S. guidelines and 
principles can have a broader impact over time. Further, many corporations headquartered 
in the U.S. have foreign subsidiaries, which provides another vehicle for influencing global 
reporting.  
This paper is both theoretical and normative in that it challenges the conventional 
wisdom underlying current financial reporting practices to embrace a stakeholder 
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perspective. Herein we are integrating existing stakeholder theory with existing financial 
and accounting theory and applying a combined theoretical perspective to a reporting 
structure that is already partially in place, but is not uniformly or universally applied. We 
also apply institutional theory as a lens for understanding the forces moving this reporting 
institution forward - to predict that eventually the institution of public financial accounting 
will be compelled to embrace the institutions developed around accounting for 
stakeholders, and that these institutions will converge. More than anything else, this paper 
challenges the reversal of the public accounting profession regarding its responsibility to 
provide nonfinancial resource-providing stakeholders with the information they need to 
manage risks associated with their engagement with the firm. Our analyses demonstrate 
that it is in the best interests of the accounting profession to embrace broader stakeholder 
reporting sooner rather than later. Towards the end of the paper we also provide some 
examples of existing measures that might serve as starting points for integration of broader 
stakeholder-based measures into the domain of public accounting. 
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SHAREHOLDER-DOMINANT PERSPECTIVE 
Darrell West (2011), director of Governance Studies and a senior fellow at 
Brookings, examined law and business school curricula and student perceptions over a 
decade, and found some results he considers ‘troubling’. Among his findings, he discovered 
that for classes that deal with the purpose of the corporation, the focus is on maximizing 
shareholder value. He also found that after students complete school they are most likely to 
consider shareholder value as the most important goal of the corporation, compared to 
other possible goals such as employee welfare or satisfying customer needs. West’s 
findings are confirmed in a new general management text by a major publisher: ‘Although 
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more managers are adopting a broader stakeholder approach to managing their firms, the 
primary goal of the firm is still to maximize profits, but to do so in an ethical and 
responsible manner’ (Gulati, Mayo and Nohria, 2014, p. 92). 
The current approach of the public accounting profession, which emphasizes the 
responsibility of a firm to its suppliers of financial capital, is justifiable on the basis of 
popular financial theory (i.e., Brealey, Myers and Marcus, 2007; Danielson, Heck and 
Shaffer, 2008; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). That is, the notion of shareholder primacy 
provides a rationale that is supportive of current accounting standards and procedures. 
After all, if the corporation exists primarily to generate returns for those who have 
provided the capital, then the focus in financial accounting on reporting for those 
stakeholders is justifiable. However, there are flaws in this argument, one of the greatest of 
which is that shareholders are the only stakeholders that bear residual risk linked to 
outcomes from corporate activities (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Williamson, 1985).  A 
broader stakeholder perspective suggests that many stakeholders experience residual risk 
and that the leaders of corporations (top management teams and directors) are 
responsible for protecting the interests of more residual risk bearers than just the 
stockholders (Asher, Mahoney and Mahoney, 2005; Brink, 2010; Stout, 2012). 
Agency theory also supports an emphasis on reporting for suppliers of financial 
capital, and specifically shareholders. Consistent with some early thinking by Berle (1931) 
that powers granted to a corporation’s managers should be exercised only for the benefit of 
the shareholders, Jensen and Meckling (1976) described corporate shareholders as 
principals and top managers as agents with an obligation to seek their financial interests 
through all legal means. Any time a manager seeks another objective an agency cost exists. 
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Agency theory has become mainstream in the management literature (see Heath, 2009; Lan 
and Heracleaous, 2010). This theory underlies much of the accounting literature as well.  
For example, the two widely accepted reasons for external financial reporting relate to 
shareholder risk assessment; they are to allow ‘capital providers (shareholders and 
creditors) to evaluate the return potential of investment opportunities’ and ‘to monitor the 
use of their capital once committed’ (Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther, 2010, p. 296).   
Although shareholder-primacy advocates use the doctrine of implied contracts to 
defend their position, this principle applies as well to other stakeholders (Boatright, 2002; 
MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989; Rousseau, 1995). As Hill and Jones (1992, p. 134) argue, 
‘Whatever the magnitude of their stake, each stakeholder is a part of the nexus of implicit 
and explicit contracts that constitutes the firm’. Based on this perspective, Zingales (2000, 
p. 1634)1 argued: ‘Once we recognize the existence of implicit contracts, then there are 
other residual claimants besides equity holders who may need to be protected (the famous 
stakeholders, often mentioned in the public policy debate). It then becomes unclear 
whether control should reside in the hands of shareholders, because the pursuit of 
shareholders’ value maximization may lead to inefficient actions, such as the breach of 
valuable implicit contracts…’.  
In an interesting twist on this theme, Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that 
breaches of implicit and explicit contracts may provide a source of value to the 
shareholders of acquiring firms, particularly during hostile takeovers. The acquiring firm 
frequently makes decisions regarding pensions, employee retention, and long standing 
arrangements with suppliers and customers that are inconsistent with the understandings 
                                                        
1 Note: Former President of the American Finance Association 
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forged previously between these stakeholders and the managers of the acquired firm. Cost 
savings can result, which are beneficial to acquiring firm shareholders. This argument is an 
unambiguous admission of the implicit contracts corporations have to their stakeholders 
(see also Asher, et al., 2005). 
It is worth noting that the agent/principal relationship found in agency theory relies 
also on an assumption that shareholders are the owners of the firm. However, if a 
shareholder were really an owner, then he/she would have power to make decisions for 
the firm and to lay claim to its assets (i.e., walk in and remove furniture or products). The 
reality is that shareholders own shares of stock in a corporation, and the corporation is a 
separate legal entity, just like a person (Stout, 2012). Directors and managers make 
decisions on how the profits, if there are any, will be distributed. Some firms pay dividends 
to shareholders and others reinvest all surpluses in new technologies and equipment, while 
other firms may provide a bonus to employees. In this sense, all of the resource-providing 
stakeholders in a firm experience residual risk, and they all receive a share of any surplus 
profits only at the discretion of managers, who are overseen by directors.  
As Marens and Wicks (1999) observe, some also claim a legal precedent to the 
concept of shareholder primacy (see also Stout, 2002). That is, they claim the law obligates 
directors to maximize shareholder wealth. Reporters and academicians, among others, 
commonly make this assertion (Stout, 2012; Adams and Whelan, 2009). The editor of 
Business Ethics even went so far as to argue that directors who do not work to maximize 
shareholder returns can be sued (Kelly, 2001). Nevertheless, the idea that the law requires 
directors and executives to maximize shareholder wealth is simply untrue (Marens and 
Wicks, 1999). Stout (2012) explains that this false notion is, in part, a result of 
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misinterpretation of a judicial opinion by the Michigan Supreme Court in 1919 that really 
had little to do with the purpose of public corporations as they are now constituted. In fact, 
the most widely cited statement from that case in support of shareholder primacy was part 
of the ‘dicta’, a tangential observation that has not been validated by Delaware’s courts, 
where many corporations are formed. In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court issued a 1985 
opinion that directors can consider other stakeholder interests (customers, employees, the 
community, and creditors) when considering the merits of a business transaction (Stout, 
2012). The courts allow directors substantial leeway in considering what is in the best 
interests of the firm through what is called ‘the business judgment rule’ (Orts, 1992). 
Another irony associated with the shareholder primacy perspective is that attempts 
alone to maximize shareholder returns may be unlikely to do so (Freeman, et al., 2010). 
Even the shareholder advocate Michael Jensen (2001, p. 298) admits this when he says 
very clearly, ‘A firm cannot maximize value if it ignores the interest of its stakeholders’. In 
another article, Jensen (2002, p. 245) also suggests, ‘We can learn from the stakeholder 
theorists how to lead managers and participants in an organization to think more generally 
and creatively about how the organization’s policies treat all important constituencies of 
the firm. This includes not just financial markets, but employees, customers, suppliers, the 
community in which the organization exists, and so on’.  
At a practical level, the shareholder primacy perspective has been associated with 
negative outcomes for firms, their stakeholders and society. For instance, Cloninger (1995, 
p. 50) observed that, ‘In the presence of asymmetric information, the avid pursuit of share 
price maximization may lead managers to violate certain stakeholder interests and employ 
business practices that are unethical, immoral, or illegal’. Evidence of shareholder primacy 
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in business organizations, and ensuing problems, is also found anecdotally. In an extreme 
case, several decades ago managers at Manville (then Johns-Manville) received information 
that asbestos inhalation was associated with lung disease. Manville suppressed the 
information and continued with production. They even concealed chest X-rays from their 
employees. In the aftermath of this scandal, a Manville lawyer was quoted as saying that in 
the interest of making a profit the company would let employees work until they dropped 
dead (Gellerman, 1986). More recently, the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was traced 
back to several decisions made by BP employees and contractors to ignore safety 
procedures in an effort to cut costs (National Commission, 2011). If we believe that if 
values such as those found among graduating business students actually translate into 
concrete behaviors, then it is also logical to expect that on a smaller scale, and thus in less 
detectable situations, decisions of this nature are presumably made on a regular basis. 
The arguments contained in this section lead us to a discussion of stakeholder 
theory as a more defensible perspective on the question of to whom the corporation is 
responsible and to whom it should be reporting.  
RESPONSIBILITY TO STAKEHOLDERS 
In a broad sense, stakeholders are groups and individuals that have an interest in 
the activities and outcomes of a firm and upon whom the firm depends in order to achieve 
its own objectives (Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harrison and Wicks, 2007). For reporting 
purposes, we are most interested in those stakeholders that are affected by firm actions. It 
is these stakeholders that provide the resources either explicitly (e.g., shareholders and 
employees), or implicitly (e.g., communities, that allow the firm to exist and create value).   
Stakeholder theory makes a firm responsible to multiple stakeholders based on both 
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normative and instrumental grounds (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995). In other 
words, a firm should look after the interests of its stakeholders because it is the right thing 
to do and because it is the means through which the firm can create more value.  
This latter notion that a stakeholder-based management approach creates more 
value has received empirical support from studies that demonstrate higher performance 
for these types of firms (Berman, Wicks, Kotha and Jones, 1999; Choi and Wang, 2009; 
Freeman, et al., 2010; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003; Preston 
and Sapienza, 1990; Sisodia, Wolfe and Sheth, 2007; Waddock and Graves, 1997).  Much of 
the empirical accounting research in this area has focused on how corporate responsibility 
reporting benefits shareholders through more informative disclosures, lower cost of capital 
and higher quality earnings (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang and Yang, 2012; Kim, Park 
and Wier, 2012). The notion is also supported in practice, with over one third of the G250 
companies reporting improved financial performance as a result of their corporate 
responsibility programs (KPMG, 2013). Nonetheless, it is not our purpose in this paper to 
advocate for broader stakeholder reporting on instrumental grounds. Instead, we return to 
the normative foundation upon which shareholder primacy is based, and discover that it 
fits nicely with a broader stakeholder perspective. 
We mentioned in the introduction that the stakeholders to whom we believe the 
public accounting profession should be responsible are those that provide important 
resources to the firm’s value creating processes, which include investors of financial 
capital, employees, suppliers, customers and communities. The ideas of residual claims and 
implied contracts found in the shareholder primacy literature can be extended to include 
this broader group of stakeholders (Marens and Wicks, 1999; Stout, 2012; Zingales, 2012). 
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For example, employees bear residual risk in the sense that their fortunes are intertwined 
with the fortunes of the company, and many employees have made specific investments in 
an organization that have no market value outside of that organization (Blair, 1995). Also, if 
the company is making a solid profit, then their own salaries, benefits and working 
conditions are expected to improve. This is an implicit contract, and if a firm is prospering 
and not sharing its spoils through better treatment of employees, however defined, there 
are likely to be ramifications in terms of employee behavior (Bosse, Phillips and Harrison, 
2009; Donaldson and Dunfee, 2000; Phillips and Johnson-Cramer, 2006; Simon, 1966). The 
firm similarly establishes implicit contracts with all of the stakeholders that are part of the 
core production function of the firm.  
Adding to the concepts of residual claims and implied contracts is the principle of 
fairness (Phillips, 1997, 2003), which suggests that stakeholders should be given merit 
based on the extent of their contributions of resources to the firm. Similarly, Clarkson 
(1994) suggests that stakeholders should be identified as such only if they bear some form 
of risk from a firm’s activities, most often because they have contributed something of 
value. These are the stakeholders to whom the firm might be expected to provide 
information that will allow them to protect their investments through making better risk 
assessments. Our emphasis, then, puts highest priority on stakeholders that bear the 
highest risks through their investments in the firm, consistent with the residual claims, 
implied contracts, and fairness arguments. Our normative argument, from an external 
reporting perspective, is that non-financial stakeholder groups that contribute significant 
resources to the corporation are as worthy of receiving reliable information (on a regular 
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basis) that will help them to mitigate their risks (residual and otherwise) as are those 
stakeholder groups that supply financial capital to the firm. 
Current “Stakeholder” Reporting 
 As Freeman (1984) stated and reaffirmed in Freeman, et al. (2010), stakeholder 
theory is not about social responsibility. It is about creating value through efficient and 
effective management in an increasingly complex and turbulent business world (Freeman, 
Harrison and Wicks, 2007). By extension, creating value is at variance with creating 
negative externalities. Thus, a firm that is spewing large amounts of dangerous waste into 
its surrounding communities is creating less value with regard to those communities. 
Similarly, a firm that is producing dangerous products (to save money) is likely to be found 
out eventually and the flow of resources from customers (sales) would be expected to 
decline. This logic applies to all stakeholder groups that provide resources to the firm. 
Stakeholder theory suggests that eventually value-lessening behavior causes problems as 
stakeholders cease to provide resources necessary to create value (Harrison and Wicks, 
2013). So although stakeholder theory is not corporate social responsibility theory, we 
believe that when viewed in light of their potential for adding value to the firm, the two 
concepts are sufficiently congruous to arrive at similar conclusions, at least with regard to 
stakeholder reporting. That is, a ‘stakeholder oriented’ or a ‘socially responsible’ firm has a 
responsibility to provide accurate reporting to a broader group of stakeholders than just 
financial investors, because these additional stakeholders also bear residual risk associated 
with value creation. 
Stakeholder theory has primarily been used in the accounting literature within 
sustainability reporting research as a theoretical framework to identify those stakeholders 
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who are engaged with a corporation (Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Gray, Kouhy  and Lavers 
1995; Prado-Lorenzo, Gallego-Alvarez and Garcia-Sanchez, 2009; van der Laan Smith,  
Adhikari and Tondkar,  2005).  However, within this literature, the theory has been 
criticized for not addressing how an organization should monitor and respond to the needs 
of stakeholders (Gray, Dey, Owen, Evans and Zadek, 1997). From a stakeholder perspective, 
current financial reporting is important because financial figures are relevant to all of the 
stakeholders that provide resources to the firm and consequently bear residual risk; but as 
we have argued, current reporting is insufficient (Harrison and Wicks, 2013). We therefore 
turn to a discussion of the needed improvements in sustainability reporting that can more 
effectively address the needs of all bearers of residual risk. 
Additional Possibilities for Sustainability Reporting 
Sustainability reporting is currently increasing in popularity, and the majority of the 
largest global corporations engage in such reporting (Kolk, 2003, 2010; KPMG, 2013). The 
sustainability premise is that firms should engage in business in such a manner that they 
do not deplete the resources necessary to engage in their business in the future (Perego 
and Kolk, 2012). For example, Royal Dutch Shell publishes an annual sustainability report 
that covers topics such as sustainability principles, safety, environmental impact, and how 
sustainable development is integrated into the company’s business strategies (Royal Dutch 
Shell, 2012). Other firms create reports that deal specifically with outcomes important to 
particular stakeholders. But there are difficulties. 
Research indicates that much of the information currently reported through 
sustainability reports is ‘not material, not assured, not measured, not aggregate 
information, not comparable with other organisations and, presenting a favorable view 
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rather than a realistic view of the organisation’s performance’ (Hubbard, 2009, p. 15). Also, 
corporate sustainability statements may lack credibility due to the possibility of ulterior 
purpose, thereby being dismissed: as part of a broad public relations effort (Freeman and 
Auster, 2011; Liedtka, 2008) or as a response to public pressure (Patten, 1995).  
Furthermore, studies on the content of sustainability reports observe significant cross-
national differences in the level and quality of corporate social disclosure (Gamble, Hsu, 
Jackson and Tollerson, 1996; Meek , Roberts and Gray, 1995; van der Laan Smith et al., 
2005; Williams and Pei, 1999; Zarzeski, 1996). Each of these difficulties limits the 
effectiveness of accounting and reporting for the benefit of all residual-risk-bearing 
stakeholders. 
Like external financial reports, independent audits of sustainability reports provide 
credibility to the reporting process and improve firm value through enhanced corporate 
reputation (Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua, 2009). However, in a study of organizational 
accountability for sustainability in G250 firms over a ten-year period, Perego and Kolk 
(2012) found great variability in the adoption of assurance practices. Also, while we stated 
in the introduction that almost 60 percent of the G250 companies have their sustainability 
information assured, less than 40 percent of the largest 100 companies across 41 countries 
do so (KPMG, 2013).  Within the U.S. the number of companies electing to have their 
sustainability reports assured is even lower, with only 16 percent of U.S. companies issuing 
assured sustainability reports in 2013 (Environmental Leader, 2014).  Also, the majority of 
sustainability audits both within the U.S. and globally stilly only provide limited levels of 
assurance (Perego and Kolk, 2012).  
 18 
One of the primary concerns that auditors have with the assurance process for 
sustainability reports is that, unlike external financial reporting, there are no sustainability 
criteria or standards that have been generally accepted by a regulatory authority (Ballou, 
Heitger and Landes, 2006; Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua, 2009; Perego and Kolk, 2012). 
The lack of accepted metrics makes it difficult to obtain the assurance necessary to develop 
an opinion on the quality of the entire report.  This typically results in sustainability 
reports that are audited only on very specific measures, providing limited usefulness to 
stakeholders (Peters and Romi, 2014). Again, these arguments support the argument that 
the public accounting profession should take more responsibility to ensure more consistent 
reporting for nonfinancial stakeholders. Using the previous sections as a foundation, we 
will now examine the present and future of accounting for stakeholders using explanations 
offered by institutional theory. 
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ACCOUNTING FOR STAKEHOLDERS 
Institutional theory is helpful in explaining the current situation with regard to both 
public financial and stakeholder accounting, and in predicting what will happen to these 
two institutions in the future. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148) argue that organizations 
tend to become homogenous within particular areas ‘that, in the aggregate, constitute a 
recognized area of institutional life’. Institutions are reflected by norms, rules, policies, 
structures and behaviors of members of organizational fields, such as professions. We will 
consider public financial and stakeholder reporting institutions separately because of the 
recent steps the public accounting profession has taken to limit its responsibility for 
broader stakeholder reporting; although we acknowledge that many accounting firms 
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participate in both institutional fields. In fact, as we will argue an eventual convergence of 
the two institutions either voluntarily or through coercion appears to be likely.  
Building on the concept of isomorphism, a constraining process that causes one unit 
in an institutional field to become increasingly more like other units in that field, DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) suggest three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change: coercive, 
mimetic, and normative isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism results from informal and 
formal pressures exerted by organizations on other organizations that depend on them, 
and from cultural expectations within society (1983, p. 150). Mimetic isomorphic processes 
involve imitation of one organization by other organizations as a response to uncertainty 
(when organizational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or 
when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty); basically, modeling themselves on 
other organizations within an institutional field rather than trying new things themselves 
(1983, p. 151). Normative pressures that lead to isomorphic organizational change are 
suggested to come from widely held norms of conduct that stem from professionalization – 
the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods 
of their work: expectations regarding how firms and individuals within a particular 
profession will behave (1983m p. 152). Clearly, institutional theory would argue that 
norms and normative pressures will have a strong influence on behavior in the accounting 
institution. 
Analysis of Present Institutions 
To understand better how isomorphic mechanisms influence the institution of 
public financial accounting, we will examine relationships among some of its key 
stakeholders relative to the three types of isomorphic pressure previously outlined. The 
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FASB holds a central position in the institution of public financial accounting in the U.S. 
because it negotiates, records and promulgates the policies, practices and rules followed by 
the public accounting profession. Consequently, the FASB has normative power with regard 
to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and with regard to 
accountants in general. However, there is also much evidence of coercive political pressure 
on the FASB, including direct lobbying and indirect lobbying to influence the FASB through 
the SEC and through political representatives (i.e., Zeff 2005a, 2005b; Königsberger 2010; 
Koh 2011).  
Public accountants and public accounting firms, whose interests are represented by 
the AICPA, also have coercive power because they are a major lobbying group and they are 
also the primary ‘customer’ of the FASB. Of course, the SEC has coercive power over the 
FASB because they have charged the FASB to establish financial accounting and reporting 
standards in the public’s best interests (which, we note, also reinforces society as a 
stakeholder). The investment community and the legal community are also key coercive 
stakeholders, which often work together to exert informal and formal pressure on the FASB 
as an organization that depends on them. We suggest that other standard-setting 
organizations such as the IASB and GRI are stakeholders primarily through normative and 
mimetic forces. Corporations, as customers of the public accounting profession, are also 
stakeholders within the institutional field of public accounting, and in this role have in the 
past exerted both coercive and normative isomorphic pressures on the FASB. There are 
other stakeholders, of course, but these appear to be most influential in terms of 
isomorphic pressure.  
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By definition, as members of an institutional field, the interests of these 
stakeholders are interconnected, and societal influences are represented through the 
actions of special interest groups, the legal community, corporate leaders, politicians, the 
media, and other forms of pressure (i.e., Campbell, 2007). There is substantial evidence 
that society would prefer broader stakeholder reporting, as reflected by demand for such 
information from groups such as Ceres, representing over 100 major institutional 
investors, who recently released a proposal recommending integrating disclosures on 
environmental and social issues into stock exchange listing rules (Ceres, 2014).  Also, the 
growing number of organizations working to provide this sort of information include 
Bloomberg, that added environmental, social and governance data to its terminals in 2009 
(Bloomberg, 2014).   Since the SEC holds coercive power over the FASB, with responsibility 
for the public interest, and societal expectations are also coercive in nature (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983), the FASB would be expected to move in the direction of providing what 
society wants. Such is not the case, at least at present. What might explain this 
contradiction? 
Of the stakeholders mentioned, we have argued that the SEC has the greatest 
coercive power over the FASB. However, we have also argued that the AICPA and the legal 
community also have tremendous influence, as was manifest, for example, in the takedown 
of Arthur Andersen after the Enron scandal. In fact, we believe the Enron/Arthur Andersen 
incident gave the legal community more salience to and coercive influence over the public 
accounting profession than it had previously because of its display of power (see Mitchell, 
Agle and Wood, 1997 for clarification of the salience construct). This logic suggests that the 
public accounting profession as normed by the FASB (and thus the AICPA) may have 
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become more risk averse, thus less willing to take on broader responsibilities for new areas 
of accounting such as sustainability accounting specifically and accounting for stakeholders 
more generally, especially since the contents of these accounts are likely to be more 
difficult to measure. In addition, widely accepted financial theory favoring shareholder 
dominance, whether appropriate or not to the needs of society at large, provides legitimacy 
to the current tighter focus of the financial accounting institution on reporting only for the 
benefit of investors and creditors. We note that this shareholder-dominance view is also 
likely to be manifest in the response of managers of the publically-reporting corporations 
the accounting profession serves; and thus many such managers would also be expected to 
resist new reporting requirements because of their expense. 
In the past, the societal stakeholder has become more salient due to urgency 
resulting from some crisis or other, such as the creation of Sarbanes-Oxley in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis. However, it is difficult to imagine what sort of crisis it might take for 
the AICPA and FASB to give enough salience to society and other corporate stakeholders as 
unrecognized holders of residual risk to cause them to embrace the creation of new 
standards for stakeholder reporting. We suggest that the international movement towards 
broader reporting might be better described as a groundswell than as the kind of crisis that 
might reshape current institutional pressures to enable stakeholder accounting standards 
to become institutionalized. However, there is another institutionally based force that may 
still accomplish such a change in direction, which we now suggest. 
Analysis of a Possible Future Institution 
As we suggested previously, another reporting institution is rapidly emerging, 
which we suggest should be made more theoretically explicit, and which we call the 
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institution of accounting for stakeholders. For several reasons the institution of accounting 
for stakeholders that we conceptualize is more responsive to current societal forces. 
Lawrence, Winn and Jennings (2001), who theorize concerning the temporal 
dynamics of institutionalization, have described several stages that an institution passes 
through before it becomes stabilized: innovation, diffusion, and legitimation (2001, p. 626). 
We argue that the institution of accounting for stakeholders has moved beyond the 
innovation stage, in which a few organizations established early standards for stakeholder 
reporting, and is now in the diffusion stage, as exemplified by broader application and 
acceptance of stakeholder reporting (sustainability reporting being the exemplar used to 
introduce our paper). We suggest that the diffusion stage has been accelerated by public 
outcry and pressure by special interest groups and the media, as well as by investors who 
would like to receive this information (e.g., socially conscious investors, managers of social 
investment funds). We further suggest that the institution of accounting for stakeholders is 
gradually moving towards the legitimation stage, in which stakeholder reporting will have 
achieved full acceptance.  Lawrence, et al. (2001, pp. 632, 634) further argue that the pace 
and stability of institutionalization are affected by a variety of mechanisms that include: 
both episodic (force or influence) and systemic (domination or discipline).  The above 
analysis that we have reported herein suggests that both influence (normative and coercive 
pressures within the USA) and discipline (mimetic international pressures) are likely to 
combine to result in a medium pace/ high stability institution in the future of accounting 
for stakeholders.  We have reason to expect this to be within the realm of possibility. 
At the firm level, some argue that social and environmental accounting has already 
become a legitimate institution (Contrafatto, forthcoming), and corporations may feel 
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compelled to disclose stakeholder information because of its legitimizing effect (Deegan, 
2002). Also, the steady diffusion of the institution of stakeholder reporting, as reflected by 
the myriad organizations involved in sustainability reporting (our example), and the 
increase in voluntary disclosures by corporations, can be thought of as somewhat of a 
threat to the current public accounting institution and as influence toward the stakeholder 
accounting institution.  Even the existence of this Special Issue in a highly prominent 
management journal suggests that legitimation is underway. The idea that the stakeholder 
accounting institution might be considered a feasible threat to the public financial 
accounting institution can be explained from two perspectives: normative and coercive 
socio-political pressures; and mimetic and normative pressures.  
Normative and coercive socio-political pressures. First, it is possible that the 
social and political forces that are shaping accounting for stakeholders might also ‘catch up’ 
with the institution of financial accounting. Research indicates that stakeholders can 
influence the way firms measure performance (Rodrigue, Magnan, & Boulianne, 2013), and 
even the establishment of reporting standards such as the development of ISO 26000 
(Balzarova & Castka, 2012). Will the public accounting profession be able to hold to its 
position that its salient stakeholders for reporting purposes are primarily the investors and 
creditors, or will it be forced to reverse its position again due to normative and coercive 
isomorphism manifest through social, political and stakeholder forces that demand 
reporting to the broader set of residual-risk stakeholders? As stakeholder accounting 
continues its path toward full legitimacy through social acceptance and desirability, the SEC 
itself might eventually respond to social pressures and coerce the FASB and thus the public 
accounting profession to conform.  
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As an illustration of this sort of coercion, for purposes of at least arguing practicality, 
the FASB itself was established in 1973 as a result of public and U.S. Government concerns 
over the independence of the previous standard setting body, which was a part of the 
AICPA. Later in the 1970’s, as a result of public pressure arising from the Penn Central 
Company bankruptcy, the U.S. Senate’s Metcalf committee expressed concern over the 
independence of accountants and the quality of audits. This resulted in the AICPA 
establishing a self-regulatory group, the Public Oversight Board, to conduct peer reviews of 
audits. However, the public outcry in the aftermath of the Enron and Worldcom 
bankruptcies led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which pulled the review of audits from 
the AICPA and established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). In 
testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, Charles Bowsher, then chairman of the 
Public Oversight Board, stated that the self-regulatory program had failed primarily as a 
result of the resistance of the AICPA to reform (Bowsher, 2002). Therefore we observe that 
if the public accounting profession does not respond to societal pressures on its own, the 
pressures extant in the institutional field of public accounting may lead to the opening of 
new hearings by the U.S. Government. 
Mimetic and normative pressures. Second, if the public accounting profession 
waits, other organizations involved in the institution of accounting for stakeholders will 
have time to establish strongly institutionalized, more uniform standards for stakeholder 
reporting through mimetic processes and normative pressures. If the U.S. Government, for 
example, due to societal and political pressures as just noted, should eventually compel the 
FASB (through the SEC) to adopt a broader perspective on reporting, the FASB would feel 
pressure to accept the stakeholder reporting institutions that have already been 
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established. This would severely erode their leadership position in the setting of standards 
and their ability to create a set of institutions that are most appealing to accounting 
professionals in the U.S.  In this regard, Campbell (2007) suggests that regulations and 
enforcement capacities are more effective if developed voluntarily through negotiation and 
consensus rather than by government mandate. 
Eventually, we predict that isomorphic influences will cause the institution of public 
financial accounting and the institution of accounting for stakeholders to converge. Support 
for this theoretical assertion is found in the fact, mentioned previously, that many public 
accounting firms are already involved in accounting for stakeholders. For example, each of 
the Big 4 accounting firms have separate, defined service groups providing client support 
for sustainability and climate change initiatives and reporting.  Also, at some point threat of 
government intervention is likely to motivate their convergence (Campbell, 2007). 
Basically, at least according to the predictions of the institutional theory we have applied to 
accounting for stakeholders, the FASB and AICPA can now decide whether they want to be 
leaders or followers during the convergence process.  
Practical Considerations 
Our analysis based on institutional theory suggests that if the public accounting 
profession does not take action to broaden its reporting requirements to serve more 
stakeholders, isomorphic forces may compel them to do so, and they could also lose their 
preeminent leadership position in the reporting profession as a result. However, there are 
also some practical reasons that the FASB is the best-suited organization to take on the 
challenge of moving the institution of public accounting from a primarily reactive one to 
one of proactivity. For example, efficiency would seem to be a major consideration, since 
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both public accountants and members of the stakeholder-based reporting institution are 
obtaining information from many of the same organizations. Would it not be more efficient, 
from a societal perspective, for the same institution to run both processes? Also, the FASB 
would enjoy a legitimacy advantage compared to other standard setting agencies. 
Another practical consideration is to consider who else might take on the initiative 
to standardize reporting for a broad group of residual-risk stakeholders. The three most 
reasonable candidates would seem to be the U.S. Government, the IASB, and the GRI. With 
regard to the U.S. Government, the SEC has the authority to require expanded disclosure of 
a company’s practices with regard to environmental and social issues (Williams, 1999). 
However, the reality is that political gridlock among government leaders often makes such 
a bold move unlikely within a short-term time horizon. Looking at the second candidate, 
the IASB does not yet have enforcement power; and their standards are not permitted to be 
used by U.S. based companies for securities listings in the U.S.  Finally, at this point in time 
at least, the GRI cannot require uniform standards, nor does it have enforcement authority.  
We therefore argue that now is an appropriate time to expand the purpose of 
external reporting because there is so much momentum behind voluntary reporting (Kolk 
and Perego, 2010; Perego and Kolk, 2012) and, as a result of so many scandals, layoffs, 
bankruptcies, broken promises, environmental concerns, and corruption, society as a 
whole is demanding better and broader reporting. Governments and stock exchanges have 
begun requiring reporting on sustainability issues (KPMG, 2013) and support for 
environmental and social shareholder resolutions reached over 21 percent for the first 
time in 2013 (Institutional Shareholder Services, 2014).  The public accounting profession 
is in the unique position of having the experience and clout to pull together and 
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standardize measurement and communication standards and processes that are currently 
widely distributed in a large number of third-party organizations, and to do so in a way 
that makes sense for corporations and their stakeholders.  
Nonetheless, while the timing may be right from a societal perspective, we 
acknowledge that such a move will not be without controversy, and may actually take some 
time to accomplish. Consider the case of the costs of disposing of a physical asset at the end 
of its useful life, such as a nuclear power plant.  Prior to 2002, there were a variety of ways 
of accounting for these costs, referred to as asset retirement obligations, ranging from no 
recognition to treatment as a depreciation expense. In 2001, the FASB issued a standard 
requiring consistent measurement, recognition and disclosure of these estimated, future 
costs even in cases where there may be no explicit contract obligating the firm to incur 
disposal costs. While controversial at the time, this standard is now accepted practice. We 
believe that beginning now to develop the procedures and practices for effective 
accounting for residual-risk stakeholders, if implemented, will also generate controversy in 
the short term (cf. Agle et al, 2008), but that they are both sorely needed and inevitable. 
AN EXPANDED PURPOSE FOR PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
 
  Based on the logic and arguments found in previous sections of this paper, we 
propose an expansion of the traditional role of external financial reporting to include 
measurement and communication of information that is relevant to stakeholders that 
provide important resources to the firm, with the purpose of allowing them to make better 
judgments with regard to the residual risks they face through engagement with a 
corporation. This information might be provided with currently required financial reports 
or in separate reports, much like the sustainability reports currently produced by many 
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corporations. The difference, of course, is that these new reports would be based on 
uniform reporting standards and would be audited. We suggest such development to be 
practical and consistent with past practice. 
Over time, accounting disclosures have developed to meet the information needs of 
financial statement users.  Since capital providers have been defined as the primary users 
of financial statements, much of the disclosure literature has focused on the information 
asymmetry between investors and managers (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Applying the 
existing financial disclosure research and models to a broader set of financial statement 
users provides a framework for understanding the information needs of these users (See 
Beyer, et al., 2010; Healy and Palepu, 2001). For example, Dye’s (1998; 2001, p. 218) 
disclosure model predicts ‘as the probability that investors are sophisticated increases, a 
seller’s propensity for making disclosures also increases’. Dye’s example of this prediction 
is the disclosure of environmental liabilities that were not disclosed when investors were 
not aware of the issue. As the ‘climate’ changed and investors became more interested 
firms had a higher propensity to disclose this information.  Disclosure of environmental 
liabilities is now a part of GAAP, as would have been predicted by institutional theory. The 
growth and level of sustainability reporting indicates that stakeholders are interested in 
this information and, as Dye’s model predicts, companies are providing it.  However, they 
are not yet doing so in a reliable and comparable form. 
We argue that corporations should have an independent auditor provide assurance 
that they adhering to standards for stakeholder-based reporting, providing an additional 
layer of credibility to the reporting process. Audited reports may not be, nor do they claim 
to be, free from errors; however, they provide a level of credibility that is absent from non-
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audited information (Neu, Warsame and Pedwell 1998). The additional assurance provided 
to financial statement users is the primary reason given for the SEC’s requirement that 
publically listed companies provide audited financial statements (www.SEC.gov). This logic 
can be extended to broader stakeholder-based reporting. 
The FASB has already defined the characteristics of information that allow it to be 
useful, identifying relevance and faithful representation as  ‘fundamental qualitative 
characteristics’ (FASB Concepts Statement No. 8). Information is relevant if it makes a 
difference in a decision; that is, it must have predictive or feedback value. Information 
provides a faithful representation if it measures what it purports to measure. Within this 
information framework the FASB establishes the accounting standards required to be used 
by all U.S. entities (see Hail, Leuz, and Wysocki (2010) for a discussion of the role of 
accounting standards). Fortunately, the public accounting profession has experience 
reporting on issues that are not purely financial. For example, the notes associated with 
external financial reports must include a discussion of risk factors (Accounting Standards 
Codification 275), pending lawsuits (ASC 450), large contracts (ASC 280), dependence on 
large customers (ASC 280), disclosures related to climate change (SEC Release No. 33-
9106), and so forth.  
There is also a deep and broad body of accounting literature examining the 
properties of the external reporting environment (Beyer, et al., 2010; Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Building on this knowledge provides a basis from which to develop stakeholder 
reporting practices. Although length constraints prevent us from full elaboration in this 
regard, we would like to at least provide a few examples of the kinds of measures 
stakeholders might find useful (see Table 1). Our examples focus on evaluation of the risks 
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of engaging with an organization, although stakeholders might also use such information to 
help determine the value they might expect to receive.  We recognize also that a static 
system, universally applied, would be problematic. We suggest that flexibility in what is 
reported across various industries will be necessary. Also, reporting practices will need to 
be examined regularly and revised based on current conditions, learning processes, and 
evolving stakeholder information needs. 
----------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------ 
 The second column of Table 1 contains examples of the types of risk factors various 
stakeholders face when they consider engaging or continuing to engage with a firm. For 
example, an employee who is considering working for a company faces risk of termination 
(or voluntary turnover), discrimination, and poor or dangerous working conditions, among 
other things. In the job interview, the company may say that they have excellent and safe 
working conditions and that people seldom leave the firm, while these statements may not 
be entirely accurate. If a firm has to report on things like turnover by level and injury rates 
or sick days by type of work, then prospective employees can better assess their risks.  
Similarly, customers and potential customers are influenced by public advertising 
and direct communications from the firm. However, if firms are required to report on 
things like return rates then they will be able to make a better assessment of the risks 
associated with buying a product from a particular company. Examples like these are 
available for all of the stakeholders that contribute important resources to the firm. Notice 
in the third column of Table 1 that there are easily available measures and that 
shareholders have much more information available to them (by financial reporting 
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mandate) to make good assessments of investment risks, as indicated by an asterisk next to 
these items.  
 We recommend that that the public accounting profession, represented by the 
AICPA, work closely with the FASB and organizations such as the GRI, the Fair Labor 
Association, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), and the 
Social Accountability Network to develop standards for reporting that are fair and 
reasonable. These and other organizations have developed voluntary standards and 
procedures that provide a background for understanding the type of information that is 
being compiled and reported. In particular, the GRI guidelines have become the 
predominant global standard for this sort of reporting (KPMG, 2013). The far right column 
of Table 1 presents examples of the GRI standards related to a variety of stakeholders. The 
GRI standards are not a solution to the problem, but the beginning of a learning process 
through which the AICPA and FASB can learn about and develop appropriate reporting 
standards for information relevant to a broader group of stakeholders.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, we argue in this paper that the public accounting profession should 
reconsider its position with regard to stakeholder reporting. We argue that the timing is 
right for the changes we have proposed herein because of all the voluntary reporting 
initiatives that have sprung up and because the public in general has lost much of its 
confidence in corporations in spite of current financial reporting requirements, both of 
which are indications of a worldwide interest in holding large businesses more accountable 
and accountable to a broader group of stakeholders than just financial investors. We have 
made a normative argument for this expansion of responsibility on the basis of two 
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principles that are foundational to current arguments supporting shareholder dominance: 
implied contracts and residual risk. Based on the principle of fairness, we have also 
identified the most worthy stakeholders for reporting purposes as those that contribute 
significant resources to the value-creating processes of the firm thereby assuming residual 
risk. In addition, an analysis based on institutional theory suggests that broader reporting 
is inevitable, and that the public accounting profession should assume an increased 
leadership role in its institutionalization. Finally, we have used efficiency arguments to 
suggest that public accounting is in the logical position to lead this effort. 
We openly acknowledge that an alternative perspective exists. For example, Benston 
(1982) wrote a compelling article outlining some of the reasons the public accounting 
profession should not be involved in the reporting of anything other than the results of 
defined market transactions (for a critique of his arguments see Schreuder and 
Ramanathan, 1984). He defends his position by arguing that managers have very little 
discretion to make decisions that are not in the best interests of shareholders due to 
markets for goods and services, finance and corporate control, management services, and 
current monitoring systems. Furthermore, he suggests that managers will treat customers, 
employees, and other stakeholders well because it is good business, and therefore 
beneficial to shareholders. Consequently, the logical conclusion is that broader stakeholder 
reporting is unnecessary to insure appropriate behavior of managers, and therefore a 
waste of resources. What we find most interesting (but not surprising) in this argument is 
its dependence on shareholder welfare, which is mentioned repeatedly in defense of 
Benston’s arguments. We note, however, that if the shareholder dominance position is 
removed from his arguments they lose much of their logical appeal.  
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Benston (1982) also argues, and legitimately so in our view, that stakeholder-based 
phenomena are hard (or perhaps impossible) to measure (cf, Agle, et al. 2008). We do not 
deny these difficulties, but rather believe it is because of the problems inherent in the 
measuring and reporting of non-financial costs that accountants should be involved, given 
their expertise in the compilation, development and reporting of financial information. 
Benston (1982, p. 102) concedes that the skills of accountants would be useful for this sort 
of reporting. The SEC in its 1980 report to Congress on the public accounting profession 
stated ‘it seems clear that auditors in the future will be required to become associated 
more and more with disclosures which are based on greater subjectivity and imprecise 
determination’ (SEC, 1980, p. 72).  As the SEC predicted, accountants are no longer limited 
to the reporting of past, unambiguously verifiable transactions.  Fair market valuation of 
investment securities and discontinued operations as well as determination of 
postretirement benefit costs are just three of the many inherently ambiguous 
measurements that accountants are routinely required to evaluate.  Further, non-financial 
costs that were once considered too difficult to measure such as carbon emissions are now 
routinely reported to regulatory entities.   
Another potential argument against reporting based upon accounting for residual-
risk stakeholders is the expense. However, some research suggests that organizations that 
are voluntarily engaging in these efforts are not suffering financially. For example, with 
regard to implementing the ISO 9000 standards, several researchers have found that 
certified organizations have higher performance (Corbett et al., 2005; Heras et al., 2002; 
Naveh and Marcus, 2007; Chow-Chua, Goh and Wan, 2003; Rajan and Tamimi, 2003) and 
voluntary sustainability reporting has been linked to lower cost of capital and higher 
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quality earnings (Dhaliwal, et al., 2012; Kim, Park, and Wier, 2012).  We concede that some 
of these findings may be due, in part, to reverse causality – better performing companies 
seek certification and report on it – but we do not believe this argument is sufficient 
justification not to require a higher level of disclosure. 
Although we have focused in this paper on reporting for residual-risk stakeholders, 
we recognize that investors may also find stakeholder accounting useful. Firms that are, for 
example, doing undesirable things to their employees, are producing shoddy products, are 
heavily polluting the environment, or are not treating their suppliers fairly are just as much 
at risk of reduced performance or even failure as firms with other types of risk (i.e., Graves 
and Waddock, 1994). Of course, employees will use this information when they are 
determining whether they want to join an organization or remain with it, suppliers will use 
it when they are assessing whether they want to supply the organization, and communities 
will use it when they are determining whether a company should be allowed to expand 
(e.g., permits) and in determining appropriate regulations. But the point is that there is 
some potential synergy in this sort of reporting because investors can also make use of it. 
The expanded reporting suggested in this paper will also help level the playing field 
by inducing firms to be more authentic; that is, exhibit more consistency between stated 
values and actual behavior (Cording, Harrison, Hoskisson and Jonsen, 2014; Freeman and 
Auster, 2011; Liedtka, 2008). Because their reports will be audited by a third party, firms 
will no longer enjoy the luxury of making as many unfounded statements about their 
behaviors with regard to issues that are vital to stakeholders. 
From an academic perspective, these recommendations could result in exciting new 
research. Currently researchers have to rely on limited data such as the KLD database and a 
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few other sources. Standardized stakeholder-based reporting across corporations would 
allow a higher level of measurement precision as well as the potential to investigate more 
issues of concern to both stakeholders and the broader society. It will also provide more 
opportunities for understanding stakeholder information needs and the processes through 
which those needs evolve.  For example, researchers will be able to more accurately assess 
the cost/benefit tradeoffs associated with a wider range of corporate behaviors. Best 
practices for stakeholder treatment will be easier to determine (Freeman, et al., 2010). 
Basically, better data for research can help advance the knowledge base for both business 
practitioners and policy makers. 
Through a critique of the existing theory underlying shareholder primacy, and a 
reapplication of some of this same theory to a broader group of stakeholders, this paper 
has laid a normative foundation for a new theoretical and practical perspective on the 
responsibility of the public accounting profession. Also, our analysis based on institutional 
theory suggests that the accounting profession will eventually be compelled to make these 
changes even if they are resisted at present. We have therefore recommended that the 
accounting profession should build upon existing voluntary reporting initiatives, and we 
have provided examples to illustrate the types of stakeholder-based measures that might 
be considered. We therefore consider the emergence of stakeholder accounting –as an 
institution – to be well underway; and we encourage each of its stakeholders to use their 
influence toward the development of the more-effective and more-representative 
discipline that we believe to be possible. 
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TABLE 1 
Examples of Stakeholder Risk Factors, Easily Obtained Measures and Global Reporting Initiative™ 
Voluntary Standards Related to Stakeholder Groups 
 
Stakeholder Risk Factor Measures Based on Data 
Already Collected Internally 
by Many Organizations 
Global Reporting Initiative™ 
 
Examples of G4-Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines 
Employees or 
potential 
employees 
-Termination 
 
 
-Discrimination 
 
-Poor working 
conditions 
 
-Dangerous working 
conditions 
 
 
-Annual turnover by level (hourly, 
salaried, management) and type 
(voluntary, non-voluntary) 
-Workforce characteristics in terms of 
race, sex, national origin, age, by level 
-Workplace policies and methods of 
enforcement 
-Injury rates and average sick days by 
type of work (manual labor, 
administrative) 
-Employee legal suits pending and 
settled* 
G4-LA6 
TYPE OF INJURY AND RATES OF INJURY, OCCUPATIONAL 
DISEASES, LOST DAYS, AND ABSENTEEISM, AND TOTAL 
NUMBER OF WORK-RELATED FATALITIES, BY REGION AND 
BY GENDER a. Report types of injury, injury rate (IR), 
occupational diseases rate (ODR), lost day rate (LDR), absentee 
rate (AR) and work-related fatalities, for the total workforce (that 
is, total employees plus supervised workers), by:  
Region  
Gender  
b. Report types of injury, injury rate (IR), occupational diseases 
rate (ODR), lost day rate (LDR), absentee rate (AR) and work-
related fatalities for independent contractors working on-site to 
whom the organization is liable for the general safety of the 
working environment, by:  
Region  
Gender  
c. Report the system of rules applied in recording and reporting 
accident statistics. 
Customers or 
potential 
customers 
-Poor product 
quality 
 
 
-Injury 
-Quality policies/procedures and 
implementation processes 
-Return rates 
-Customer legal suits pending and 
settled* 
-Customer satisfaction 
G4-PR5 
RESULTS OF SURVEYS MEASURING CUSTOMER 
SATISFACTION a. Report the results or key conclusions of 
customer satisfaction surveys (based on statistically relevant 
sample sizes) conducted in the reporting period relating to 
information about:  
The organization as a whole  
A major product or service category  
Significant locations of operation 
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Stakeholder Risk Factor Measures Based on Data 
Already Collected Internally 
by Many Organizations 
Global Reporting Initiative™ 
 
Examples of G4-Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines 
Shareholders 
or potential 
shareholders 
-Agency problems 
 
 
 
 
-Inaccurate financial 
reports/theft 
 
-Business risks 
-Systematic risk 
-Board independence* 
-Ownership holdings by top managers 
and directors* 
-Top manager compensation and 
policies* 
-Shareholder proposals* 
-Compliance with standard financial 
reporting procedures* 
-Disclosure of major business risks* 
-Beta* 
-Percentage of new R&D projects 
G4-38 
a. Report the composition of the highest governance body and its 
committees by:  
Executive or non-executive  
Independence  
Tenure on the governance body  
Number of each individual’s other significant positions and 
commitments, and the nature of the commitments  
Gender  
Membership of under-represented social groups  
Competences relating to economic, environmental and social 
impacts  
Stakeholder representation  
Communities -Water usage 
-Pollution 
 
-Business 
disruptions/loss of 
jobs 
 
 
-Negative impact 
from growth 
-Measures of water usage 
-Measures of carbon and non-carbon 
emissions and waste 
-Disclosure of percent of workforce 
overseas and fair warning (2 years) of 
plans to outsource to other 
geographic locations 
-Policies regarding actions to mitigate 
negative externalities (beyond 
pollution) and implementation of 
policies 
G4-EN8 
TOTAL WATER WITHDRAWAL BY SOURCE a. Report the total 
volume of water withdrawn from the following sources:  
Surface water, including water from wetlands, rivers, lakes, and 
oceans  
Ground water  
Rainwater collected directly and stored by the organization  
Waste water from another organization  
Municipal water supplies or other water utilities  
b. Report standards, methodologies, and assumptions used. 
Suppliers -Late payments 
 
-Opportunism 
-Contractual 
discrimination 
-Average payment time* for suppliers 
as well as longest payment time 
during a period 
-Supplier legal suits pending and 
settled 
-Characteristics of the top managers 
of contracting organizations in terms 
of race, sex, national origin, age 
G4-EC9 
PROPORTION OF SPENDING ON LOCAL SUPPLIERS AT 
SIGNIFICANT LOCATIONS OF OPERATION a. Report the 
percentage of the procurement budget used for significant 
locations of operation spent on suppliers local to that operation 
(such as percentage of products and services purchased locally). 
b. Report the organization’s geographical definition of ‘local’. c. 
Report the definition used for ‘significant locations of operation’. 
*Already consistently reported in some form. The reporting format and measurement processes would become standardized for this information, thus 
making it easier for the relevant stakeholder to find. 
